Most Asian countries have adopted bonus-malus systems (BMS) in automobile insurance. We evaluate the toughness towards consumers of 16 Asian BMS and its correlation with cultural and economic variables. We use principal components analysis to define a Maturity Index of insurance markets and find supporting evidence for a conjecture that, as markets become more mature and policy-holders more sophisticated, countries adopt tougher BMS. In addition, we find, using regression analysis, that using a Common Law legal system is a crucial factor in BMS design. Cultural variables, such as uncertainty avoidance, also influence BMS.
In this article we revisit these two conjectures, with particular emphasis on East and South Asia. This region of the world is of much interest, as it includes countries with strong and mature insurance markets (Japan, Singapore), markets expanding at a rapid pace (China, India), as well as emerging markets (Malaysia, Sri Lanka) . Also, Asia is the only continent where national BMS are enforced in all countries. In other continents, individual insurers are able to devise their own BMS in several countries. The BMS and insurance markets of the following 16 Asian countries are analysed: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam. Principal components analysis and regression models are built to explain the toughness of BMS by means of a set of economic and cultural variables to check whether, as conjectured by Lemaire and Zi, the design of BMS is related to the degree of maturity of markets and national culture. In several countries (Philippines, Kazakhstan) insurers are considering implementing a BMS. In other countries (India, China) changes to the existing BMS are contemplated. Results should help practitioners involved in BMS design to develop systems that correspond to their country's level of development and cultural approach to insurance.
The coefficient of variation (CV) as measure of toughness of BMS
BMS need to have simple transition rules, easily understood by policy-holders. Certificates issued in case of an insurance company switch also need to be easy to establish: they should not require the current insurer to collect the entire claims history of the policy-holder. This explains why all BMS in force around the world can be characterised as discrete Markov Chains. The first published treatment of BMS through Markov Chain theory is due to Franckx. 2 A large set of references on the Markov Chain analysis of BMS can be found in Lemaire. 3 BMS can be studied from the insurer's or the policy-holder's perspective. Mixed Poisson distributions have traditionally been used to model the insurer's claim count probabilities; mixing distributions that have been proposed include the Gamma, 4 a two-point discrete distribution, 5 the Inverse Gaussian, Beta, Uniform, Pareto 6 and the Weibull, Bessel, w 2 and truncated Normal. 7 The Poisson distribution has been used exclusively to model individual policy-holder's claim counts; it is used in this research.
Dozens of observed claim number distributions have been presented in the actuarial literature. Articles that compare the goodness-of-fit of different models using several observed distributions include Denuit 8 and Gossiaux and Lemaire. 9 For claims 2 Franckx (1960) . 3 Lemaire (2004) . 4 Bichsel (1960) . 5 Derron (1963) . 6 Willmot (1986) . 7 Albrecht (1982) . 8 Denuit (1997) . 9 Gossiaux and Lemaire (1981) .
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distributions pre-dating the first 1974 oil shock, observed means range between 0.10 and 0.20. More recent distributions exhibit observed means between 0.07 and 0.12, averaging 0.10. Therefore, in this article, we assume that the number of claims of each policy-holder follows a Poisson distribution with mean 0.10. We evaluate the toughness of BMS by the CV of a policy-holder's BMS premium, once the Markov Chain has reached stationary state. The CV, sometimes also called the Unitized Risk, is a normalised measure of risk, defined as the standard deviation (STD) divided by the mean of a random variable. Insurance researchers commonly use this measure to compare risk across lines of business. For instance, Bu¨hlmann and Gisler 10 find that claim size CVs for various lines range between 2.0 for household and motor hull insurance to 9.0 for motor liability and Workers' Compensation (in case of accident) insurance. AON 11 quantifies the systemic risk or volatility associated with each line of business for 17 countries comprising over 75 per cent of the world's global premium. Risk is defined as the CV of the loss ratio of each book of business. CVs range between 0.14 for private passenger auto insurance to 3.51 for financial guaranty insurance.
The CV is an appropriate measure to evaluate the toughness of BMS. It is a dimension-less parameter, suitable for international comparisons as it is independent of currency conversions. Without any form of BMS or experience rating, the variability of the annual premiums paid by a given policy-holder is zero (perfect solidarity). Without any kind of insurance, drivers need to pay all claims out-of-pocket, and the variability of payments, the variability of the claims process, attains its maximum value (no solidarity). A BMS represents an intermediate situation, as annual premiums become a random variable and personalised premiums vary according to claims history. The CV of the stationary annual premium consequently measures solidarity across policyholders: the tougher the BMS, the higher the CV.
More importantly, the CV was found to be the best measure of toughness in Lemaire and Zi. 1 In that study the authors introduced four measures of toughness, summarised in an Index of Toughness using principal components analysis. The CV was found to be by far the best single measure of toughness, with a correlation of 0.97 with the composite Index of Toughness.
The BMS in force (as of June 2008) This ranking is certainly surprising. Few would expect that Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, two of the poorest countries in our database, would adopt the toughest BMS in Asia. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka both have very severe penalties in case of a single claim. In Bangladesh, the transition rules of the BMS send any policy-holder with one claim to premium level 130, irrespectively of the current class; the premium level from a best-class driver will increase from 50 to 130, a 160 per cent increase, after just one claim. Sri Lankan transition rules are hardly more lenient: drivers from the bottom three classes, at premium levels 30, 35 and 40, move up three classes after one claim. Drivers in all other bonus classes, at premium levels 45-95, lose their entire 10 Bu¨hlmann and Gisler (2005) . 11 AON (2008) . This initial result appears to contradict Lemaire and Zi's conjecture #1, that tougher BMS are found in the most developed countries, but we explore further statistical studies, based on principal components and regression analyses.
Factors influencing the toughness of BMS
According to Lemaire and Zi, BMS design is linked to insurance "maturity", an abstract, qualitative concept, that we approach by defining several variables that are intuitively related. Insurance markets are probably more mature in richer countries, in countries where a large fraction of the GDP is devoted to insurance, in countries where a large number of companies compete. Sophisticated BMS are in force in countries with developed insurance markets; development can be slowed by political, financial and economic risk: nations with little risk are more attractive to foreign investment. Also, it is likely that some cultures are more prone to the development of insurance than others; in some countries, there are alternative ways than insurance to reduce life's uncertainties, for instance, a developed family kin system.
12 This leads to the definition of several variables that are probably correlated with the maturity of insurance markets-hence to the severity of BMS. The study uses 2005 data, the latest available for some variables.
The non-life insurance density, at Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
In its annual study of world insurance markets, the Swiss Reinsurance Company 13 ranks 88 countries according to Non-Life Insurance Density, defined as the premium 
Market concentration
A mature insurance market is expected to have many insurers freely competing for customers, thus a low market concentration. We measure concentration with a modified Herfindahl Index, defined as the sum of the squared market shares of the ten largest non-life insurers (Source: Axco Insurance Markets Report 14 and International Fact Book: www.internationalinsurance.org/international/toc/). The number of actuaries per 100,000 inhabitants A large number of actuaries in a country is indicative of insurance sophistication and development. In addition, actuaries are instrumental to the design of BMS (Source: International Actuarial Association, www.actuaries.org, for number of actuaries and U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/ranks.html, for population data).
The GDP per capita, at PPP More affluent countries, as measured by GDP per capita at PPP, are likely to have more mature insurance market (Source: CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov).
The political risk index
Nations where there is little political and investment risk are more likely to have mature insurance markets, as the financial environment is more conducive to foreign investment, and financial contracts such as insurance policies are easier to enforce. Total scores range between 0 and 100, with 100 representing a very low degree of political risk (Source: www.prsgroup.com).
Not only the maturity of the insurance industry, but also other factors such as culture and history, may impact BMS design. Hence we introduce two non-economic variables that may influence BMS.
Uncertainty avoidance
In a celebrated study, Hofstede 15 analysed the answers of 117,000 cultural survey questionnaires collected within subsidiaries of a large multinational business organisation, in 66 countries. Four cultural dimensions of national culture emerged from the study:
Power distance: measures how societies react to human inequality; Individualism: describes the relationship between the individual and the collectivity prevailing in a given culture; Masculinity: evaluates whether biological gender differences impact roles in social activities; Uncertainty avoidance: scores tolerance for uncertainty.
Different societies, and business organisations within societies, react differently to uncertainties about the future and the resulting anxiety and need for security. They try to cope with risk by introducing laws, rules, regulations, religion and technology. Uncertainty-avoiding societies promote employment stability, select managers on the 15 Hofstede (2001) .
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There is some evidence that uncertainty avoidance impacts financial markets. De Mooij 16 finds that individuals residing in high uncertainty avoidance countries invest less in stocks and more in goods. Kwok and Tadesse 17 show that financial systems are more likely to be bank-based in high uncertainty avoidance countries, and market-based (relying on stockmarkets) in low uncertainty avoidance countries.
While the management concept of uncertainty avoidance is not identical to insurance researchers' notion of risk aversion, it is certainly correlated. It represents the best available international measure of attitudes towards risk across countries, and is used in our analysis to explore the possible impact of cultural attitudes in the toughness of BMS. High uncertainty avoidance countries are likely to have milder BMS because tough BMS means more risk in future premiums.
A high score on this measure characterises uncertainty-avoiding societies, such as Japan and Korea. China, Hong Kong and Singapore receive the lowest scores in Asia.
Commonwealth countries
While every country has its own specific legal rules, scholars broadly subdivide all legal systems of the world in two families. Civil Law systems originated with Roman Law and the Napoleonic Code, and were spread around the world by France through conquest, colonisation, cultural dominance and imitation. Common Law systems are based on British law, and are in force in the countries that were colonised or heavily influenced by the British. Seven of the 16 Asian countries under study are former British colonies, and are members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Their legal system is based on Common Law. The other countries use Civil Law. The classification used in this research is based on Reynolds and Flores. 18 Out of the 16 Asian countries included in our database, eight use a Civil Law system.
The legal system in force in a country may impact the development of insurance, as it specifies the liabilities of those responsible of damage, and defines the business environment of insurance companies.
19 For instance, the United States leads the world in per capita consumption of liability insurance. The American legal system may be a contributing factor, by encouraging Americans to over-consume property-liability insurance. 20 16 De Mooij (1998) . 17 Kwok and Tadesse (2006) . 18 Reynolds and Flores (1998) . 19 Browne et al. (2000) . 20 Syverud et al., 1994) . 
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An index of insurance maturity
Due to the fairly low number of observations and high correlations between some variables, to avoid possible multicollinearity problems we construct an Index of Insurance Maturity using principal components analysis based on our first four measures, the insurance industry-oriented variables: insurance density and penetration, market concentration, and number of actuaries (GDP and Political Risk Index will be used as alternative measures of insurance market maturity later in the analysis).
We do not need to limit our sample to Asian countries to construct our Insurance Maturity Index: a larger sample will improve the efficiency of the principal component analysis and improve the significance of explanatory variables. Furthermore, a larger sample will enable us to compare the insurance market maturity of Asia to markets in other continents. Therefore, we use worldwide data (82 countries) 21 to construct the Insurance Maturity Index. The first principal component, providing an excellent summary of the four variables by explaining 66.95 per cent of the total variance, is our Index of Insurance Maturity.
22 Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients between the first two factors and the four selected variables.
Where do Asian countries rank in the world? Table 3 presents the factor score of all 16 Asian countries, in decreasing order, and their worldwide rank.
Taiwan ranks highest among Asian countries on this Index. Taiwan has enjoyed an open, competitive market for many years, as 31 non-life insurance offices operated in the country in the colonial period. In 1995, restrictions on foreign investment in joint ventures were eliminated, and the market opened to insurers from all nationalities. Privatisation was fully completed in 2002 with the revocation of the Central Reinsurance Act. Competition is intense, as Taiwan is a closed market with little new business, and more capacity available than is required to support the needs of the domestic industry. Further examples of insurance maturity include a Residential Earthquake Insurance Pool and a Nuclear Pool. This open market has made Taiwan the 13 th largest market in the world, quite a performance given that its population is only 23 million.
14 With 16.2 per cent, Taiwan ranks first in the world in overall insurance penetration, well ahead of the other mature Asian markets: South Korea (5 th ), Hong Kong (6 th ), Japan (9 th ) and Singapore (17 th ). The average of the 16 Asian scores is À0.5149. As worldwide scores have a mean of 0 and a STD of 1, we reach a first conclusion: 21 Swiss Re's density and penetration data was available for those 88 countries that registered premium volumes of at least US$ 347 m in 2006. Data for six of those countries was not available from the Axco International Fact Book, resulting in 82 countries included in our sample. 22 The second component explains about 20.44 per cent of the variation and it is highly correlated with market concentration. It appears to be uncorrelated with insurance maturity.
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The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice S16 foreign participation. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore have totally opened their markets. It is then unexpected that a single factor-participation in the Commonwealth of Nations-drives the toughness of BMS.
We conjecture that there could be two possible explanations for this. The first is that, according to legal research, Common Law is more conducive to economic development, with the consequence that Commonwealth countries may implement more efficient and more severe BMS. The second explanation is that BMS were introduced much earlier in Britain than in Continental Europe; upon achieving independence, former British colonies had well-established BMS in place, while former colonies of Continental European powers had no BMS (or embryonic BMS) and had other priorities in developing their insurance markets than devising tough BMS. In the Discussion section, we discuss these two possible explanations in more detail.
In order to investigate whether the strong correlation between CV and Commonwealth is due to their legal system or a historical reason, we introduce an interaction variable (Insurance Maturity Â Commonwealth) in our regression analyses. If the historical explanation is true (British BMS were in place at independence), we should find a stronger Commonwealth effect among countries with less mature insurance market. Advanced countries modify their BMS now and then to adapt to changing driving conditions, while developing countries do not consider BMS rating to be a crucial part of their insurance system. Consequently, we expect the poorer former colonies of Britain to have left their BMS mostly unchanged, while Britain 0 s influence on BMS should have progressively dissipated in Asia's mature markets. On the other hand, if a Common Law system is the reason for the strong correlation, its impact will be similar for all countries, advanced or not, and we do not expect to find a significant effect on this interaction variable.
Results of regression analyses for Asian countries
In this section, regression analyses are presented to help us understand the factors driving the design of a BMS. First, we run a regression model with CV as dependent variable and the Insurance Maturity Index, Uncertainty Avoidance, Commonwealth, and the interaction term as explanatory variables (regression 1 in Table 5 ). Alternatively, we also run models with GDP and Political Risk Index, respectively, as economic development measures instead of Insurance Maturity Index (regressions 2 and 3 in Table 5 ). We do not include these three variables simultaneously due to their high correlations. As our dependent variable, CV, cannot take negative values, we run Tobit models.
23
The regression coefficients of Insurance Maturity Index, GDP and Political Risk, are all positive: the Lemaire and Zi conjecture that more mature insurance market have tougher BMS receives ample support. Noteworthy is the result that the main factor impacting the design of a BMS is the legal system: positive regression coefficients in all specifications imply that Commonwealth countries tend to use 23 We also run the same model using OLS, and a model treating Kazakhstan and Philippines as missing countries, rather than countries with a CV equal to zero. Alternative regression models are presented in Appendix A. 
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tougher BMS. The joint test F-statistic for Commonwealth and the interaction term shows significance in all models; the negative regression coefficient suggest that the impact of Commonwealth membership is weak in mature insurance markets, and mostly impacts poorer countries. This supports the historic hypothesis of the Commonwealth's impact on BMS.
Conclusion 2:
As markets become more mature and policy-holders more sophisticated, countries adopt tougher BMS. BMS should evolve over time, to properly reflect changing economic conditions. Economic development leads to increased traffic, and a decrease in accident claim frequencies. Insurers should respond to these developments by enforcing tougher BMS, penalizing more claims at-fault, which would enable them to provide higher discounts to better drivers.
Conclusion 3:
Common Law legal systems, in force in former British colonies, appear to be a major contributing force to BMS design, especially in poorer countries.
Results of regression analyses for expanded data set
In Table 5 , the cultural variable, uncertainty avoidance, has the predicted sign, but is not significant. This may be due to the limited sample size. In order to achieve a better 24 We understand that there could be systematic differences between Asia and Europe (continent effect), as well as between 2008 and 1992 (year effect). However, since all 2008 data is from Asian countries and all 1992 data is from European countries, a single dummy variable is sufficient to capture both continent and year effects. With the inclusion of this dummy variable, we are able to control for the systematic differences between Europe in 1992 and Asia in 2008, if any. This enables us to pool the two data sets and enhance the explanatory power of other variables of interest.
With the expanded data set, we first run a regression with only European countries. Summary statistics for European countries are presented in Table 4 . Regression results are shown in column (2) of Table 6 , with column (1) restating results from the Asian regression for comparative purposes. As the U.K. is the only Commonwealth country in Europe, no interaction term is introduced. Results show that regression coefficients 
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of Asian and European countries are somewhat different. First, Commonwealth is not an important factor in Europe; even the sign of the Commonwealth variable is different in the two models. Second, while the regression coefficients for uncertainty avoidance in the Asian and European models are similar, the variable is only statistically significant in Europe. That is, countries with higher uncertainty avoidance have significantly milder BMS in Europe.
The different results for Asia and Europe may simply be due to the fact that European markets are generally more mature. To explore this possibility, we run a regression for countries with a positive Maturity Index (regression 3, Table 6 ). This amounts to adding five Asian countries (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) to the European group. Regression coefficients hardly change and become more significant, adding robustness to our conclusions. The dummy variable Asia, added to capture the year and continent effect, has no significant effect. Uncertainty avoidance remains a highly significant explanatory variable, further demonstrating the importance of cultural aspects in BMS design in mature markets.
Another regression for countries with a negative Maturity Index (regression 4, Table 6 ) markets further demonstrates the importance of Commonwealth for poorer countries, supporting the historic influence hypothesis that poor Commonwealth countries inherited a BMS that they hardly changed since independence.
Finally, another regression for all 30 countries is presented (regression 5, Table 6 ), that includes an interaction term (Commonwealth Â Maturity Index) to capture the differential effect of Commonwealth on more and less mature markets. Results are consistent with previous findings: BMS toughness is associated with Commonwealth, uncertainty avoidance and insurance market maturity. A strong Commonwealth effect only appears among less mature markets, further supporting the historic influence hypothesis.
Discussion
The main conclusion of the previous section is that-perhaps surprisingly-a legal system based on Common Law, characteristic of Commonwealth countries, is a main contributor to the enactment of tougher BMS. We provide two possible explanations, based on insurance history and characteristics of legal systems. Our regression analyses support the historical explanation.
Possible superiority of common law legal systems
In Civil Law countries, legislation is the primary source of law. Civil Law is based on a code that specifies main principles, and on new statutes passed by legislature to amend the existing code. Courts base their decisions on the provisions of codes and statutes. Judicial precedent is given little weight. By contrast, individual cases are the primary source of Common Law. Laws develop through court decisions rather than through statutes. Judges create and refine the law: when a new situation arises, judges have the authority to make law, and so create a precedent that binds future decisions. Proponents of Civil Law claim that systematic codification is conducive to certainty and unity. Opponents fear that codification results in the ossification of the law. They
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claim that Common Law is more adaptable to new trends because it responds, case by case, to the changing needs of society; judges progressively reinterpret the law that evolves through a series of progressive steps.
Some legal research claims that Common Law is more conducive to economic development than Civil Law. La Porta et al. 25 uses regression analysis to show that Common Law countries generally have higher law enforcement quality and stronger legal protections of creditors and investors. Min 26 argues that Common Law's reliance on judicial opinion may contribute to commercial growth. Precedents provide reasonable guidance on issues and more certainty of outcome in case of a dispute, so parties can predict whether a proposed action is likely to be lawful. By contrast, in Civil Law countries, consistency is not guaranteed, judges must rule anew on each issue; parties cannot rely on a large body of precedents. As a result Common Law countries adapt more rapidly to changing conditions and new opportunities.
27
Insurance may be a textbook example of the ossification of laws in Civil Law countries and adaptability in Common Law systems. Until the 2002 rating freedom mandated by EU directives, insurers in most Continental European countries operated under a system of compulsory premiums approved by governmental authorities, with little room for creativity and competition. By contrast, British insurers have always enjoyed full rating freedom and little supervision from the Department of Trade and Industry.
28 British policy-holders have always been offered a considerable diversity of motor insurance products, with each insurer free to decide on its own rating structures and on premium relativities within these structures.
The creativity and adaptability allowed by Common Law systems is also evident in BMS design. Continental European insurers have tried to maintain uniform national BMS as long as possible after the 2002 laws. France and Luxembourg even won court cases allowing them to keep a common BMS for all companies. British insurers have taken advantage of the flexibility allowed by Common Law to offer different BMS; their policy-holders at one point were able to choose among more than 50 different sets of transition rules and premium levels. British insurers were also the first to introduce a "protection clause" in their BMS, allowing partial or total forgiveness of the first accident at-fault.
Historical development of BMS
In a summary of the development through time of BMS, Lemaire 3 mentions that British insurers introduced simple merit-rating systems in auto insurance as early as the 1910s, while Continental European companies mostly developed their BMS in the 1960s, following early ASTIN work (among others see Bichsel 4 , Bü hlmann 29 and Delaporte 30 ). Consequently, when they became independent after World War II, it is 25 La Porta et al. (1998) . 26 Min (2006) . 27 Posner (2004) . 28 Johnson (1985) . 29 Bu¨hlmann (1964) . 30 Delaporte (1965) . likely that Commonwealth countries had well-established, fairly severe BMS in place. Former colonies of Continental European countries, on the other hand, probably had no BMS in place at independence, given that their colonial power had yet to implement such systems (or only used embryonic systems).
Any change in BMS is usually strongly impacted by the existing situation: it is rarely the case that a completely new BMS is introduced, without any consideration to the previous system. More often than not, the change is evolutionary: stronger transition rules are enacted, super-discount bonus classes are added, a protection scheme is introduced. Consequently, it is probable that current BMS in some Asian Commonwealth countries do not deviate very much from the systems in force at independence. On the other hand, non-Commonwealth countries, that likely had no BMS in place at independence, needed to devise their own system. Since BMS design in these emerging insurance markets was not a high-priority task, it is not surprising that non-Commonwealth countries implemented fairly mild BMS.
Our results offer support to the historical explanation. Affluent countries, whether in Europe or Asia, belonging to the Commonwealth or not, regularly change their BMS to end up with a system that corresponds to their insurance maturity and cultural approach to insurance. Poorer countries do not consider BMS design as an important rating tool and keep their existing system; former British colonies inherited tough BMS that they hardly changed. Former colonies of Continental European powers did not inherit a BMS tradition, and implemented no BMS or a mild BMS. Examples abound: the Lemaire and Zi study mentions nine affluent countries that changed their BMS in the early 1990s. Japan changed its BMS three times in the 1980s, three times in the 1990s, and then again in 2004. In 1992, Singapore and Malaysia shared the same BMS; the richer of these two countries, Singapore, has changed its BMS since, while Malaysia has not.
Appendix A Alternate models
In this section we provide two alternative regression models: a model that excludes the two countries (Kazakhstan and Philippines) with no BMS, and an OLS regression using the robust error option in Stata. The results demonstrate the robustness of our conclusions. Countries with mature insurance market and low uncertainty avoidance, and Commonwealth countries, have tougher BMS. The effect of Commonwealth is stronger in less developed markets (Table A1) . 
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Hofstede's other cultural variables Hofstede 15 provide four dimensions of national culture: individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power distance and masculinity. We only included uncertainty avoidance in our models to test the hypothesis that milder BMS are preferred by high uncertainty avoidance consumers, other things being equal. Indeed uncertainty avoidance is the only measure introduced by Hofstede that relates to an insurance concern: risk aversion. However, it is possible that other cultural variables may influence BMS design, and omitted variable may bias estimates. Therefore, we run the same regression models including Hofstede's other cultural measures. Table A2 demonstrates the robustness of our conclusions: the other cultural variables are all statistically insignificant in all models; regression coefficients hardly change after inclusion of other cultural variables. Therefore we conclude that only the uncertainty avoidance measure is associated with the toughness of bonus-malus system. Omitting other cultural variables does not cause bias. 40, 40, 40, 42, 42, 45, 45, 50, 50, 55, 60, 60, 70, 80, 90, 90, 100, 120, 130, 160 One-class discount Three-class penalty with each claim Korea 40, 45, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200 Discount given after three consecutive claimfree years; one-class discount if at100 or below, to 100 o.w.
Complicated system penalizing accidents with points depending on cost of accident, degree of injury, and severity of traffic offense Malaysia 45, 55, 61.68, 70, 75, 100 One-class discount Back to level 100 with any claim Pakistan 66. 67, 75, 80, 85, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140 One-class discount if at level 100 or below; to level 100 if in malus zone Taiwan 40, 60, 80, 100, 120, 140, 160, 180, 200, 220, 240, 260 On the basis of total number of claims in past three years. Each year without a claim: À1 point. One claim in past three years: 0 point; each claim thereafter: +1 point. Each negative point decreases the premium by 20%, each positive point increases the premium by 20%
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